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ABSTRACT

Camus, Kelly Ann. M.S., Department of Psychology,
Industrial and Organizational Psychology Program, Wright State University, 2015.
Once Careless, Always Careless? Temporal and Situational Stability of Insufficient Effort
Responding (IER).

In the current paper, I examined insufficient effort responding (IER) as a substantive construct
rather than as a methodological nuisance as other researchers have done. Specifically, I focused
on the relationship between personality traits and IER and the temporal and situational stability
of IER. I hypothesized that agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness, and extraversion would
be negatively associated with IER and that neuroticism would be positively related to IER. Also,
I predicted that the extent to which a given participant engages in IER would be relatively stable
across time and across tasks. The current sample (N = 288) consisted of students from
undergraduate psychology courses at a public university in the Midwestern United States. I
found little evidence that Five-Factor Model (FFM; McCrae & Costa, 1987) traits were related to
IER and no support for IER being stable across tasks. However, I found evidence suggesting
that IER was stable across time. I discussed theoretical and practical implications of the study as
well as future research directions.
Keywords: Insufficient Effort Responding; Careless Responding; Behavioral
Consistency; Personality
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I. INTRODUCTION
Technological advances have allowed for the extensive use of computer-based
questionnaire administration for psychological research. Lower costs, greater convenience, and
increased speed for collection of greater volumes of data have all led to the prevalence of
computer-based surveys in research (Barak & English, 2002; Ward & Pond, 2015). The
common use of computer-based data collection suggests that researchers expect that their
participants are attentive and provide the most honest, accurate responses possible when
completing questionnaires. However, because computer-based questionnaires collect data at
varying times and places, this common research method introduces unknown context effects on
participants’ responses. This phenomenon was less of an issue before the computer era because
then data were collected via paper-and-pencil surveys (see Beach, 1989). Researchers have
found that on-line anonymity in computer-based surveys may encourage participants to respond
carelessly to questionnaire items due to the lack of accountability (Douglas & McGarty, 2001;
Lee, 2006; Meade & Craig, 2012). Furthermore, the inherent lack of environmental control with
on-line questionnaires may cause participants to respond more carelessly to items due to possibly
increased environmental distractions. Now in the context of computer-based questionnaires,
researchers are beginning to realize that not all participants are attentive when completing a selfreport questionnaire. Insufficient effort responding (IER), also called careless responding,
describes a situation in which a participant inattentively responds to self-report questionnaire
items (Huang, Curran, Keeney, Poposki, & DeShon, 2012; Meade & Craig, 2012).
IER is one way in which participants can provide poor quality data. Nichols, Greene, and
Schmolck (1989) described content responsive faking and content nonresponsivity as the two
main types of problematic respondent behavior. Content responsive faking occurs when
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participants pay attention to item content, but they provide inaccurate responses. Thus, their
responses correlate with the item content, but their responses demonstrate some degree of
inaccuracy (Nichols, Greene, & Schmolck, 1989). This respondent behavior includes both
intentional and unintentional faking. Social desirability refers to the tendency of participants to
respond to questionnaire items in such a way that they are favored by the researchers (Paulhus,
1984). The behavior can be either good or bad faking: participants can over-report desirable
behavior or under-report behavior deemed undesirable. For instance, a job applicant completing
a self-report questionnaire as part of an interview assessment will want to appear favorably to the
prospective employer. So, the applicant might respond to items to appear highly conscientious
when, in fact, the applicant is low in conscientiousness. Thus, the applicant might be motivated
to respond to the questionnaire items in such a way that does not accurately represent the
applicant’s true personality, negatively influencing the data quality.
This undesirable respondent behavior is different from content nonresponsivity. Content
nonresponsivity occurs when a participant responds to questionnaire items without paying
attention to the item content. Meade and Craig (2012) identified random responding (Beach,
1989), careless responding (Curran, Kotrba, & Denison, 2010), and protocol invalidity (Johnson,
2005) as different terms used to refer to content nonresponsivity. To capture these constructs
into one concept, Huang et al. (2012) proposed the term insufficient effort responding (IER) and
defined it as “a response set in which the respondent answers a survey measure with low or little
motivation to comply with survey instructions, correctly interpret item content, and provide
accurate responses” (Huang et al., 2012, p. 100). Therefore, IER includes both random and
nonrandom responding and can be intentional or unintentional. However, what makes IER
distinct from content responsive faking and impression management is that IER demonstrates a
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lack of effort and inattentiveness rather than the effortful attention and diligence inherent in both
social desirability and faking (Huang et al., 2012; McGrath et al., 2010). In fact, researchers
have suggested that both social desirability and faking may be negatively related to IER (Maniaci
& Rogge, 2014; Meade & Craig, 2012).
IER Prevalence
Researchers have found that participants vary in which points in a self-report
questionnaire they engage in IER (Huang et al., 2012; Meade &Craig, 2012). It seems likely that
if a participant is not interested in the questionnaire from the start that the participant could
engage in IER right at the beginning of the questionnaire until the end whether they engage in
IER consistently or sporadically (see Schwartz, 1999). More research needs to be conducted
directly examining individual differences regarding where in a questionnaire that participants
engage more in IER. Despite whether a participant engages in IER from the beginning of a
questionnaire, Meade and Craig (2012) suggested that IER engagement becomes more common
as a participant spends more time completing a questionnaire.
In addition to the differences regarding in which parts of a questionnaire participants tend
to engage in IER, discrepancies exist in the estimated prevalence of IER. Researchers have
found that IER estimates range from anywhere as low as 3.5% to as high as 73% (Baer,
Ballenger, Berry, & Wetter, 1997; Berry et al, 1992; Ehlers, Greene-Shortridge, Weekley, &
Zajack, 2009; Johnson, 2005; Kurtz & Parrish, 2001). Differences in the particular indices used
to detect IER partially explain the varying reports of IER prevalence (Curran, Kotrba, &
Denison, 2010). Estimates of IER tend to be high when researchers have assessed whether
participants have engaged in IER when flagged by an IER index, but estimates of IER tend to be
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low when researchers have assessed whether participants have engaged in IER throughout most
of a questionnaire (see Meade & Craig, 2012).
IER Detection Methods
Researchers have used various approaches to detect IER. One approach is employed by
inserting items designed to detect IER within a self-report questionnaire prior to administration
(e.g., bogus items; Beach, 1989). The second approach, known as post-hoc (Meade & Craig,
2012), involves conducting statistical analyses (e.g., examining response patterns) after data is
collected (Meade & Craig, 2012). In the following sub-sections, I discuss in greater detail
common methods used to detect IER.
Psychometric Synonyms and Antonyms. Two of the most common ways to detect IER
are psychometric synonyms and psychometric antonyms (Goldberg & Kilkowski, 1985). These
methods are based on the premise that participants who are paying attention will respond to
similar items in a consistent manner throughout a questionnaire. Psychometric synonyms are
items that are conceptually the same (e.g., “I tend to enjoy social events” and “I am an outgoing
person”). Thus, they are positively correlated. On the other hand, psychometric antonyms are
items that are conceptually opposites of each other (e.g., “I am anxious most of the time” and “I
tend to be calm”). Thus, they are negatively correlated.
Psychometric synonyms and antonyms are computed by examining the within-person
correlations across item pairs. Traditionally, if a pair of items has a correlation of .60 or higher
for the sample as a whole, that item pair is the psychometric synonym index, and if a pair of
items has a correlation of -.60 or lower for the sample as a whole, that particular item pair is the
psychometric antonym index (Meade & Craig, 2012). Then, scores for each of the two indices
are computed by performing within-person correlations between each set of items. Thus, the
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overall psychometric synonym and antonym index scores range from -1 to 1. A higher
psychometric synonym score indicates that it is less likely that the participant engaged in IER.
Similarly, a lower psychometric antonym score indicates that it is less likely that the participant
engaged in IER. Although researchers consider these indices to be some of the more useful IER
detection methods (Huang et al., 2012; Meade & Craig, 2012), the psychometric synonyms and
antonyms indices can be used only within long questionnaires with hundreds of items (Goldberg
& Kilkowski, 1985; Meade & Craig, 2012).
Bogus Items. Another method used to detect IER is by inserting bogus items into a selfreport questionnaire. A bogus item is an item in a survey that has an obvious correct response
(Beach, 1989). Bogus items are worded in such a way that all item responses from all
participants who read and understood the items would be identical. For example, “I was born on
February 30th” is a bogus item. This item is phrased so that if any participant attentively reads
the item, the participant will not endorse the item. If the participant does endorse the item, that
participant will be flagged for engaging in IER.
One advantage of bogus items is that they can detect IER throughout a questionnaire
because they can be inserted at any point in a questionnaire. However, there are a few
disadvantages to bogus items. Because they are added to a survey prior to administration, they
make surveys longer, which could affect participants’ fatigue. Moreover, participants may
interpret some bogus items as funny because of how nonsensical they are (e.g., All my friends
say I would make a great poodle; Meade & Craig, 2012). These funny items might cause
participants to respond differently, such as endorsing the item because they thought it was funny
or not taking the rest of the survey seriously because they thought the researchers did not take
their research seriously. Therefore, using bogus items should be considered if survey fatigue is
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not too much of a concern, i.e., if the survey is not long prior to inserting the bogus items, and if
the bogus items do not seem so nonsensical that the participants change how they would
otherwise respond.
Long String. Whereas the prior two methods involve inserting items, the next methods I
describe involve statistical analyses. Meade and Craig (2012) referred to two different ways to
identify participants with nonrandom IER response patterns (i.e., responses that are too
consistent): the “maximum long string index” and the “average long string index.” The
maximum long string index assesses the greatest number of times that the participant provided
the same response to consecutive items throughout a questionnaire (Costa & McCrae, 2008;
Meade & Craig, 2012). The average long string index refers to the average of the longest string
of repeated responses for each page on a questionnaire (Meade & Craig, 2012). Because the
Long String methods were designed to detect nonrandom IER behavior, they are unable to
effectively identify random, or inconsistent, IER (Meade & Craig, 2012).
Outlier Index. A multivariate outlier analysis approach to IER detection involves
flagging participants who consistently respond to items far from the mean of an item set (Ehlers
et al., 2009). For example, suppose there is a sample of survey respondents with varying item
responses that center around a particular mean (i.e., 3), but there are two respondents with
averages (i.e., 5) that fall multiple standard deviations away from the sample mean. These two
respondents would be considered outliers and thus would be flagged by the outlier index. The
idea behind the IER outlier index is that if a participant pays sufficient attention throughout a
questionnaire, that participant’s average item responses will be close to the mean item responses
for the entire sample. However, if a participant is engaging in IER, that participant’s average
item responses will be far from the mean sample average responses. Meade and Craig (2012)
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used an outlier analysis in which they computed three dichotomous flag variables. Specifically,
an item was flagged as IER if the averaged Mahalanobis distance, the multivariate distance
between a response and the response sample mean, exceeded a critical value associated with p =
.05, p = .01, and p = .001 (Meade & Craig, 2012). Thus because researchers have found that IER
scores tend to center around the midpoint of a scale (see Maniaci & Rogge, 2014; Meade &
Pappalardo, 2013), any scores that are far away from the midpoint should be viewed as outliers
for typical IER engagement.
Response Time. The two common ways to detect IER by examining participant
response time are the total time spent responding to the questionnaire and the average time spent
responding to a single page of the questionnaire (Huang et al., 2012). Although response times
that are too short are an obvious indicator of IER, it still remains unclear what long response
times mean. Because there are many other factors that can influence a person’s response time,
interpretation of response time for IER can be a problem and thus should be approached with
caution.
Regardless of the type of detection approach, IER negatively impacts data quality
(Huang et al., 2012; Meade & Craig, 2012). For instance, IER can either attenuate or artificially
inflate predictor-criterion relationships and thus increase the chances of Type I and Type II errors
(Clark, Gironda, & Young, 2003; Huang, Liu, & Bowling, 2015). Therefore, because detection
of IER is critical for maintaining data quality, researchers are concerned also with how to
minimize the likelihood that participants engage in IER.
IER Prevention Methods
Similar to IER detection methods, researchers use different ways to try to prevent
participants from engaging in IER. One approach to IER prevention is through incentives. If a
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participant does not have an incentive to respond carefully, then there is an increased chance that
the participant will engage in IER. Incentives relate to strong situations which describe when
individual differences in behavior are less likely to occur due to the pervasive situational cues
that dictate how a person should behave (Meyer, Dalal, & Hermida, 2010). Stronger or greater
numbers of incentives are indicative of strong situations. If an incentive is strong enough,
individual differences in behavior are less likely to occur, making behavior across individuals
more uniform. For instance, if a job applicant is completing a survey as part of an interview
process, the applicant should have a strong incentive to read and respond carefully to each item
because the applicant’s responses influence the likelihood of receiving the job. However, a job
incumbent who is completing a survey for his employer should have less of an incentive to
respond carefully compared to the job applicant because the incumbent already has the job.
Thus, there is no strong incentive for the incumbent to provide accurate responses.
Another way to prevent IER via incentives is through warnings. In one study,
researchers warned participants that inattentive survey responses could be detected and
participants who provided such responses would no longer be eligible to receive credit for
participation (Huang et al., 2012). The researchers found that the warning condition was
effective at preventing IER. Specifically, participants engaged in less IER if presented with the
warning compared to receiving no warning (Huang et al., 2012).
A final approach to IER prevention may be questionnaire anonymity. Although some
researchers have asserted that anonymity of questionnaires increases likelihood for participants
to engage in IER because they feel less accountable for their responses thus leading to less of an
incentive to respond carefully (Douglas & McGarty, 2001; Lee, 2006; Meade & Craig, 2012),
other researchers have argued that this anonymity helps to decrease IER in questionnaires.
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Specifically, Meade and Craig (2012) found that when participants disclosed their identity, they
endorsed fewer bogus items (i.e., a way to detect IER) and scored higher on a self-reported
attention scale. I have discussed ways to prevent IER. Next, I discuss possible causes of IER.
Possible Causes of IER
Meade and Craig (2012) identified four possible causes of IER. Questionnaire length
might cause IER (Huang et al., 2012; Meade & Craig, 2012). A participant needs a certain
amount of cognitive resources to be able to complete a questionnaire. Questionnaires that are
long can deplete a person’s resources. This resource depletion can lead even the most careful
participants to become fatigued and thus respond carelessly in questionnaires. Meade and Craig
(2012) suggested that there is a positive correlation between IER and survey length. In fact,
researchers have found that IER is positively associated with survey length (Baer et al., 1997;
Berry et al., 1992).
Also, researchers have suggested that social contact may be a cause of IER (Meade &
Craig, 2012). The prevalence of online questionnaires has created a common lack of social
contact between the participant and the researcher. Because no researcher is present when a
participant completes an online questionnaire at a place of his or her choosing, increased social
distance may cause a participant to feel less accountable for his or her actions and thus provide
less motivation for the participant to respond carefully to a survey item (Johnson, 2005; Meade
& Craig, 2012).
Another possible cause of IER is environmental distractions. Because research is
collected typically through online questionnaires, participants usually have the flexibility of
completing the questionnaire at a time and place of their choosing. Although this has led to
greater convenience on the part of the participant, this has led also to a lack of environmental
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control. Because there is a lack of control over the environment in which a participant chooses
to complete the questionnaire, there is a chance that a participant chooses to complete the
questionnaire in a setting that is rife with distractions (e.g., people loudly talking, television
blaring, music playing). Moreover, the participant could be multitasking while completing the
questionnaire. Researchers have suggested that increased environmental distractions lead to
higher levels of IER (Carrier et al., 2009; Meade & Craig, 2012; Spelke, Hirst, & Neisser, 1976).
I have discussed possible causes of IER. Next, I discuss where there is a lack in the IER
literature.
IER as a Substantive Variable
Previous studies have investigated IER primarily as a methodological nuisance (Huang et
al., 2012; Meade & Craig, 2012). In other words, researchers have focused on the detection of
IER and the removal of high-IER respondents from further analyses. Rather than treat IER as a
methodological nuisance, I examined IER as a substantive variable. Because researchers have
conducted previous IER research mainly in the context of single-survey administration within a
single setting rather than within longitudinal contexts, little is known about the within-person
stability of IER over time and across situations. As a result, it is unclear whether IER is a
product of enduring characteristics of respondents or a product of the situation. Therefore, the
main purpose of the current study was to investigate whether IER is temporally and situationally
stable. In the following section, I discuss personality to provide a theoretical basis for why IER
can be expected to display significant within-person stability across time and across situations.
Stability of IER: Impact of Personality and Situations
By definition, personality is stable across time and across situations, meaning that a
person’s personality—and hence behavior—generally will remain consistent across different
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contexts (Funder & Colvin, 1991; Leikas, Lӧnnqvist, & Verkasalo, 2012; Sherman, Nave, &
Funder, 2010). Personality traits are related to different constructs. For example, researchers
have found that both agreeableness and neuroticism are associated with social desirability (Ones,
Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996). Because social desirability and personality traits are related and
social desirability relates to IER, it seems plausible that there is an association between
personality traits and IER. If certain participants tend to provide low-quality self-report data and
this tendency is dependent on particular personality traits, then these traits may affect the extent
to which the participants engage in IER, thus supporting an existing relationship between
personality and IER. Therefore, in this section, I first address the main effects of personality
traits on IER. Then, I discuss the possibility that IER partially reflects an individual difference in
how people respond to self-report questionnaires.
Main Effects of Personality on IER. Personality likely influences the degree to which a
person engages in IER (Maniaci & Rogge, 2014; Meade & Pappalardo, 2013). For example,
Meade and Pappalardo (2013) found that extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness
were related to respondents’ likelihood of engaging in IER. However, the results of that study
should be regarded with caution because the researchers did not make any a priori hypotheses
regarding the relationships between personality traits and IER prior to conducting the study.
Furthermore, they used self-report measures to assess personality, which presents a
methodological problem. That is, if a given participant engaged in IER throughout the study,
then he or she can be expected to have engaged in IER when completing the personality
measures. This would jeopardize the researcher’s ability to assess the personality of that
participant. Moreover, researchers have found advantages of using other-report measures rather
than self-reports to assess personality traits; other-reports often provide more accurate measures
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of personality than do self-reports (Connelly & Hülsheger, 2012; Connelly & Ones, 2010; Kolar,
Funder, & Colvin, 1996). For instance, Bowling et al. (2015) used other-reports from one rater
and found that agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, and neuroticism were related to
participants’ IER behavior. Given the problems associated with using self-report measures of
personality, I used other-reported measures of personality. Also, I built upon the Bowling et al.
paper by using reports from multiple raters.
Furthermore, because researchers have found that the Five-Factor Model (FFM; McCrae
& Costa, 1987) personality traits, which represent individual differences, correlate with IER
(Bowling et al., 2015; Maniaci & Rogge, 2014; Meade & Pappalardo, 2013), there is a strong
conceptual basis for expecting that the extent to which a survey respondent engages in IER will
reflect enduring individual differences. Thus, in the current study, I viewed IER as a trait,
positing that IER is a relatively stable and enduring personality attribute. Further, I posited that
IER reflects individual differences in how a person responds to a self-report measure, which can
be characterized by the extent to which the person 1) possesses the motivation to be attentive and
inquisitive when completing a self-report measure and 2) complies with the researchers’
instructions such that the person provides accurate self-report data. In the following subsections, I discuss the conceptual links between specific FFM traits (Costa & McCrae, 1992;
McCrae & Costa, 1987) and IER.
Agreeableness. Because people who are high in agreeableness tend to comply with
others’ requests and have the desire to please others (Costa & McCrae, 1992), researchers have
expected that agreeable participants closely follow researchers’ instructions. On the other hand,
if a participant is low in agreeableness, he or she is less likely to be concerned with following the
researcher’s requests. Thus, a disagreeable participant would have less motivation to remain
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attentive throughout the completion of the survey. Using other-report personality data, Bowling
et al. (2015) found that participants low in agreeableness tend to engage in higher levels of IER.
Given the above theorizing, I expected to observe a negative relationship between other-reported
agreeableness and IER.
Hypothesis 1: Other-reported agreeableness will be negatively associated with IER.
Conscientiousness. People who are high in conscientiousness have a tendency to pay
close attention to detail, are thorough and diligent, have self-discipline, and are high in need for
achievement (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 1990). As a result, I posited that participants
who are conscientious would take the time to closely read questionnaires and be motivated to
exert effort when responding to survey items. On the other hand, people low in
conscientiousness lack a high need for achievement and motivation to pay attention to detail.
Therefore, I posited that low-conscientiousness participants would engage in IER. Using otherreport personality data, researchers have found that survey respondents who are low in
conscientiousness tend to be more careless in their responses to questionnaires than are those
who are highly conscientious (Bowling et al., 2015). Given the above theorizing, I expected to
observe a negative relationship between other-reported conscientiousness and IER.
Hypothesis 2: Other-reported conscientiousness will be negatively associated with IER.
Openness. People who are high in openness are curious about the world around them
and they value learning (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 1990). Furthermore, people who are
high in openness tend to enjoy reading (Goldberg, 1992). Participation in a questionnaire study
can be a valuable learning experience, and it requires reading. As a result, participants who are
high in openness should be relatively careful when responding to self-report questionnaires.
However, people who are low in openness tend to be uninterested in learning, and they dislike
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reading. Bowling et al. (2015) found evidence that participants who are low in other-reported
openness tend to engage in more IER. Given the above theorizing, I expected to observe a
negative relationship between other-reported openness and IER.
Hypothesis 3: Other-reported openness will be negatively associated with IER.
Extraversion. Because people who are high in extraversion are talkative and engaging
towards others, extraverts tend to enjoy social interactions (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Goldberg,
1990). In situations that involve interacting and communicating with others, extraverts tend to
be sociable and outgoing compared to people who are low in extraversion. Thus, in a research
study conducted in the laboratory, a participant who is high rather than low in extraversion will
tend to be more talkative and engaging towards the researcher. It might be that these social
interactions motivate the participant to care more about the study, and, therefore, engage less in
IER, compared to a less communicative, more quiet and reserved participant. Using other-report
personality data, Bowling et al. (2015) found that participants low in extraversion tend to engage
in higher levels of IER. Given the above theorizing, I expected to observe a negative
relationship between other-reported extraversion and IER.
Hypothesis 4: Other-reported extraversion will be negatively associated with IER.
Neuroticism. People who are high in neuroticism are likely to experience feelings of
stress, anxiety, anger, and depression (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 1990). These people
tend to have intense negative emotional reactions to simple everyday events and are more likely
to perceive those events as stressful. On the other hand, people who are low in neuroticism are
more emotionally stable and less anxious. Because people who are high in neuroticism more
easily experience stress, they may interpret a seemingly simple task such as completing a
questionnaire as a daunting and stressful experience. This experienced stress could negatively
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affect participants’ thinking so that they do not respond as carefully and thus engage in greater
IER. Moreover, because people who are high in neuroticism are high in negative affect
compared to people who are low in neuroticism, a highly neurotic participant might experience
negative affect towards the researcher or might become easily annoyed with research
participation. These negatively-charged emotional experiences might lead a participant to be
less motivated to remain attentive. In fact, Bowling et al. (2015) found that participants high in
neuroticism tend to engage in higher levels of IER. Given the above theorizing, I expected to
observe a positive relationship between other-reported neuroticism and IER.
Hypothesis 5: Other-reported neuroticism will be positively associated with IER.
Behavioral Consistency across Different Situations. Situational factors likely
influence IER. For example, the degree to which a participant engages in IER might vary
depending on whether he or she is completing a survey at home while surrounded by numerous
distractions (e.g., television, cell phone, music, people talking) or alone in a quiet room without
any distractions (Buchanan, 2000; Meade & Craig, 2012). As described above, personality is in
some instances the primary cause of behavior. In other instances the situation is the primary
cause of behavior. This concept is consistent with situational strength theory. Specifically,
situational strength describes when certain behaviors are more desirable than others due to
environmental cues (Meyer, Dalal, & Hermida, 2010). When a strong situation is present (e.g.,
being in a research lab), the relationship between the person’s personality and his or her
behaviors is less important because the person’s behavior is more likely to be determined by the
environment than by his or her personality. For example, being a research participant in a
laboratory is a strong situation. Being a research participant in a laboratory (a situational cue)
dictates that the participant is expected by the researcher to remain attentive throughout the
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study. Outside a laboratory setting, the participant’s attentive behavior might be dictated by the
person’s conscientious personality. However, when a weak situation is present, the association
between a person’s personality and behavior strengthens because the cues in the environment are
more ambiguous. For example, being a research participant for an online study is a weak
situation. Whether the participant decides to remain attentive throughout completing the survey
depends more upon the participant’s personality, whether he or she is conscientious, than upon
the actual environment because a researcher is not present to emphasize the importance of paying
attention while completing the questionnaire. This intersection between personality and
situations relates to the theory of behavioral consistency, which asserts that people’s behaviors
are generally stable across time and across situations (Funder & Colvin, 1991; Leikas, Lӧnnqvist,
& Verkasalo, 2012; Sherman, Nave, & Funder, 2010).
There are different ways to categorize behavioral consistency. In the current study, I
focused on rank-order behavioral consistency (see Sherman, Nave, & Funder, 2010). Rank-order
consistency occurs when a given person’s behavior remains stable relative to the behavior of
others (e.g., Funder & Colvin, 1991; Sherman et al., 2010). For example, Funder and Colvin
(1991) found that people who demonstrated expressive nonverbal behaviors during a
conversation were expressive also during a debate. Although the context or the situation
changed, the people who were most expressive in one context tended to be the most expressive
in a different context. In other words, their behavior remained consistent relative to that of
others. In the current study, I focused on IER’s rank-order behavioral consistency. Specifically,
I examined whether a person’s relative level of IER remains stable across time. I note that being
stable across time also meant being stable across situations because all participants completed
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the measures on-line at Time 1 and in a laboratory setting at Time 2. This confounded time and
setting, and this confound was necessitated by data collection constraints.
Hypothesis 6: IER will be relatively stable across time. Specifically, the extent to which
participants engage in IER at Time 1 will be positively associated with the extent to
which they engage in IER at Time 2.
Finally, I examined situational similarity effects on rank-ordered behavioral consistency
in relation to IER in terms of task type. That is, I examined the degree to which a person
engages in IER in two different tasks (i.e., a self-report questionnaire and an open-ended
narrative-writing task). The two tasks were different from each other in terms of what they
demanded from participants (see Table 1). The questionnaire contained items with a response
format on a graphic rating scale, ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” A person
was presented with several options from which to choose for each item. The narrative-writing
task was different. Because the person was instructed to think about a hypothetical situation and
provide his or her thoughts, the person was not presented with response options. The narrative
was an open-ended response format whereas the questionnaire was closed-ended. Also, given
the diversity in the content of these two tasks, rank-order consistency in the performance across
the tasks provided a relatively conservative test of the effects of IER.
Hypothesis 7: IER will be relatively stable across tasks. Specifically, the extent to which
participants engage in IER while completing one task will be positively associated with
the extent to which they engage in IER while completing the other tasks.
However, the two tasks shared one common feature. They each demanded the
participant’s careful attention, and participants were likely to perform well on both if they put

18
forth sufficient effort. I predicted that stable personality traits are related to IER (see Hypotheses
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5).
II. METHOD
Participants
I used a sample of 288 undergraduates enrolled in an undergraduate psychology course at
a medium-sized public university in the Midwestern United States. Because I was unable to
match some participants’ data across the two phases and some participants only completed the
first phase, 3 participants were dropped from analyses. The final sample size was 285. Because
some participants did not have any other-report personality data, 73 participants were dropped
from the personality analyses for Hypotheses 1 through 5. So, a sample size of 212 was used for
the analyses testing Hypotheses 1 through 5. All participants were native English speakers;
66.3% (n = 189) of participants were female, and the mean age was 19.93 years. Participants
received class credit for their participation.
Design
The study used a within-person design. There were two separate phases to the study: an
“on-line phase” and a “laboratory phase.” In the on-line phase, participants completed both a
self-report questionnaire and an open-ended narrative task. The order in which the participants
completed the two on-line tasks was counterbalanced. In the laboratory phase, participants
completed both a self-report questionnaire and an open-ended narrative task. The order in which
the participants completed the two laboratory tasks was counterbalanced. The self-report
questionnaire that participants completed was identical across the two phases. Participants were
randomly assigned to complete one of two different open-ended narrative tasks in the on-line
phase; whichever narrative task they did not complete in the first phase is the task that they
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received and completed in the laboratory phase. On average, there were 10 days between the online and laboratory phases. The on-line phase occurred on-line at a place of the participant’s
choosing. All participants completed the laboratory phase after the on-line phase.
On-Line and Laboratory Measures
Self-report questionnaire. Participants completed a self-report questionnaire during
both the on-line and laboratory phases. The questionnaire included bogus item IER measures
(Huang, Bowling, Liu, & Li, 2015; Maniaci & Rogge, 2014; Meade & Craig, 2012) as well as
substantive personality measures from the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP; Goldberg,
1992, 1999, 2006). The bogus items and the personality items in the on-line questionnaire were
identical to the bogus items and the personality items in the laboratory questionnaire. Both
questionnaires consisted of 50 personality items and 7 bogus items. The complete questionnaire
is included in Appendix A, and a table detailing the source of each item is in Appendix B.
Bogus item. A bogus item (Beach, 1989) has an obvious correct answer. That is, a
bogus item is worded in such a way that if a person reads the item, he or she should easily be
able to provide the correct response. If a person responds incorrectly to a bogus item, that person
is likely engaging in IER. An example item is “I was born on February 30th.” Clearly, it is
impossible to be born on February 30th, and thus the correct response to that item is “disagree.”
Agreeing with this example item is therefore evidence of IER. The response options for each
item were anchored on a 7-point graphic rating scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly
agree. Refer to Appendix C for a complete list of the bogus items and their correct responses.
The questionnaire contained seven bogus items from Huang, et al. (2015) and Meade and
Craig (2012). It is important to include multiple bogus items in a questionnaire so that the items
can be dispersed throughout the questionnaire. Participants can vary at which point they engage
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in IER when completing a questionnaire (see Huang et al., 2012; Meade & Craig, 2012). Some
participants may engage in IER towards the beginning of a questionnaire; some may engage in
IER towards the middle; some may engage in IER towards the end of the questionnaire; and,
some participants may engage in IER throughout the entire questionnaire. Therefore, dispersing
bogus items throughout the questionnaire was imperative to be able to flag a participant who
engaged in IER.
IER scores for each participant were computed by summing the dichotomously scored
bogus items. If a participant responded with agree or strongly agree to true items (e.g., I am
using a computer currently; see Meade & Craig, 2012), then the response to the bogus item was
considered correct and was scored as “0.” However, if a participant provided any response other
than agree or strongly agree to true items, the response was considered incorrect and was scored
as “1,” indicating the presence of IER. If a participant responded with disagree or strongly
disagree to false items (e.g., I have never used a computer), the response to the bogus item was
considered correct and was scored as “0,” whereas if a participant provided any other response,
the response was considered incorrect and was scored as “1.” Therefore, a high total score of
bogus items was indication that a person engaged in IER. I computed separate IER scores for the
on-line phase and the laboratory phase. The Cronbach’s alpha obtained for bogus items in the
on-line phase was .61 and .47 in the laboratory phase.
Personality items. The questionnaire included self-report measures of substantive
variables, specifically items from the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP; Goldberg, 1992;
Goldberg 1999). The IPIP consists of items for each of the FFM personality factors (i.e.,
extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability [neuroticism], and
intellect/imagination [openness]). Ten items for each of the FFM personality traits were
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included in the self-report questionnaire. All items were administered on a rating scale ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Example of items included “I am quiet around
strangers” (extraversion), “I feel others’ emotions” (agreeableness), “I shirk my duties”
(conscientiousness), “I get irritated easily” (emotional stability), and “I spend time reflecting on
things” (intellect/imagination). These items were included to ensure that the questionnaire was
reasonably long enough to induce IER and served as a medium in which to imbed the bogus
items. Note that the length of the current questionnaire was shorter than is typical in IER
research. As a result, I was unlikely to observe inflated levels of IER in the current
questionnaire. Although this might have provided a conservative test of my hypotheses, Huang
et al. (2015) found high levels of IER within a short questionnaire. Reliabilities obtained for the
self-reported FFM traits in the on-line phase were .57 for openness, .63 for conscientiousness,
.59 for extraversion, .68 for agreeableness, and .65 for neuroticism. And reliabilities for the selfreported traits in the laboratory phase were .65 for openness, .78 for conscientiousness, .69 for
extraversion, .77 for agreeableness, and .72 for neuroticism.
Open-ended narrative task. Participants completed two different open-ended narrative
tasks (one during the on-line phase and one during the laboratory phase; see Appendix D). Half
of the participants were randomly assigned to complete a narrative about their ideal vacation in
the on-line phase and a narrative about their dream job in the laboratory phase; and half of the
participants were randomly assigned to complete a narrative about their dream job in the on-line
phase and a narrative about their ideal vacation in the laboratory phase. I tracked which
narrative each participant completed in the on-line phase so that he or she did not complete the
same narrative during the laboratory phase.
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The number of words written in response to each of the narrative tasks was used to
indicate the amount of effort that participants put into the open-ended narrative tasks. Writing
few words indicated that the participant likely engaged in IER. So that a high score reflected
high IER—as it did with the bogus item measure—open-ended narrative IER scores were
computed by multiplying the number of words written by -1. Huang et al. (2014) used a similar
open-ended narrative task in their research—specifically, number of written words for an openended question about the participant’s job description—and found a negative correlation between
IER and word count (r = -.19, p < .05). Bowling et al. (2015) used a similar task in their study
and found a negative correlation between IER and the number of written follow-up journals (r =
-.33, p < .001). I computed separate narrative task scores for the on-line phase and the laboratory
phase.
Other-Reported Measure
Other-reported personality. Participants were asked to identify five people who they
knew well to serve as judges of the participant’s personality. The judges identified by the
participants were e-mailed an on-line short form of the IPIP (see Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, &
Lucas, 2006). This scale consists of 20 items and assesses each of the FFM traits (four items per
FFM trait). The short form of the IPIP was used for the other-reported measure of personality
because the FFM trait items were examined as predictors of IER. Participants with data from at
least one judge were used to test Hypotheses 1 through 5. On average, each participant had 2.61
judges of personality. Reliabilities obtained for the other-reported FFM traits were .55 for
openness, .67 for conscientiousness, .71 for extraversion, .35 for agreeableness, and .62 for
neuroticism. Refer to Appendix E for the other-report questionnaire and Appendix F for a table
detailing the source of each item.
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Procedure
The study included two phases: An on-line phase and a laboratory phase. The on-line
phase was completed prior to the laboratory phase for all participants. I recorded the number of
days elapsed between the on-line phase and the laboratory phase. This average elapsed time was
roughly 10 days. The on-line phase included a self-report questionnaire and an open-ended
narrative (see Table 2). The order of administration of these two tasks was counter-balanced.
The laboratory phase included a self-report questionnaire and an open-ended narrative. The
order of administration of these two tasks was counter-balanced. At the end of the laboratory
phase, participants completed two additional tasks (e.g., proofreading and grading an exam),
which were not used in the current study’s analyses.
III. RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
Normality of IER indices. Before conducting analyses to test my hypotheses, I
examined first the normality of the distributions of the on-line bogus item IER measure,
laboratory bogus item IER measure, on-line narrative IER score, and laboratory narrative IER
score variables. These preliminary analyses used the skewness and kurtosis statistics with their
respective standard errors for each of the variables. A distribution was considered non-normal if
the z-score values for skewness and kurtosis were greater than 3.3 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2000).
The on-line bogus item IER measure was non-normally distributed, with skewness of 3.87 (SE =
0.14) and kurtosis of 21.12 (SE = 0.29). The laboratory bogus item IER measure was nonnormally distributed, with skewness of 3.51 (SE = 0.14) and kurtosis of 17.13 (SE = 0.29). The
on-line narrative IER score was non-normally distributed, with skewness of -2.42 (SE = 0.14)
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and kurtosis of 9.43 (SE = 0.29). The laboratory narrative IER score was non-normally
distributed, with skewness of -0.88 (SE = 0.14) and kurtosis of 1.41 (SE = 0.29).
Because all four variables were non-normally distributed, I performed both square root
and log10 transformations in an attempt to normalize the distributions (see Tabachnick & Fidell,
2000). However, because the transformations did not make the distributions normal and because
the conclusions from the hypothesis tests were the same with both the transformed and nontransformed data, I used the original non-transformed data in all of the subsequently reported
analyses. It is important to note that the non-normal distributions of the bogus items variables
were not surprising because past studies typically have found that relatively few participants
engage in IER (see Meade & Craig, 2012). Thus most of the participant data for bogus item
scores was close to zero, which would be indicative of a skewed, non-normal distribution.
Moreover, the non-normal distributions of the open-ended narrative task variables were likely
due to the large number of extreme values within the data, leading to skewed distributions.
Furthermore, I examined multivariate outliers within the other- and the self- reports of the FFM
traits, and there was not a difference in the conclusions from the hypothesis tests when the
outliers were excluded from analyses, so I kept the outliers for inclusion of data analysis.
Intraclass correlations for other reported personality. I computed intraclass
correlations (ICC1s) to estimate the extent to which personality scores provided by different
raters of the same target resembled each other. Aggregating personality scores across raters
generally is appropriate when agreement index values are greater than .70 (Dixon &
Cunningham, 2006). A moderate level of consistency was found between the other-reported
ratings for openness: the average measure ICC was .55 with a 95% confidence interval from .15
to .79, F(20, 80) = 2.21, p < .01. A substantial level of consistency was found between the other-
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reported ratings for conscientiousness: the average measure ICC was .68 with a 95% confidence
interval from .39 to .85, F(20, 80) = 3.04, p < .01. A substantial level of consistency was found
between the other-reported ratings for extraversion: the average measure ICC was .72 with a
95% confidence interval from .46 to .87, F(20, 80) = 3.48, p < .01. A moderate level of
consistency was found between the other-reported ratings for agreeableness: the average measure
ICC was .35 with a 95% confidence interval from -.23 to .70, F(20, 80) = 1.53, n.s.. A
substantial level of consistency was found between the other-reported ratings for neuroticism: the
average measure ICC was .62 with a 95% confidence interval from .28 to .83, F(20, 80) = 2.61, p
< .01. In sum, the ICCs suggest that, with the exception of extraversion, the raters were not
sufficiently high in consistency of the other-reported ratings for the personality traits. It should
be noted that for all subsequent analyses, I controlled for the number of raters.
FFM Traits and IER (Hypotheses 1 through 5)
I predicted that other-reported agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness, and
extraversion would be negatively related to IER (Hypotheses 1 through 4) and that neuroticism
would be positively related to IER (Hypothesis 5). To test these hypotheses, I computed four
Pearson product-moment correlations for each of the five personality traits: (a) a correlation
between the other-reported personality trait and IER on the on-line bogus item measure, (b) a
correlation between the other-reported personality trait and IER on the on-line narrative, (c) a
correlation between the other-reported personality trait and IER on the laboratory bogus item
measure, and (d) a correlation between the other-reported personality trait and IER on the
laboratory narrative. The correlations and descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3. I found
very limited support for any of these five personality hypotheses. However, there was one
exception to these null findings. Openness was significantly related to the on-line narrative IER
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score (r = -.14, p < .05). Also, I dichotomized IER so that a participant was flagged as engaging
in IER or not engaging in IER rather than analyzing IER as being continuous, and then I ran a
point-biserial correlation between the other-reported personality and IER measures. Although
the correlations were stronger and closer to statistical significance, this analysis did not change
the conclusions from analyses of the hypotheses. Overall, the findings related to personality and
IER were weak with FFM trait-IER correlations ranging from -.14 to .10. Thus Hypotheses 1
through 5 received very limited support.
Stability of IER across Time (Hypothesis 6)
I predicted that IER would be relatively stable across time (Hypothesis 6). In other
words, I predicted that the extent to which a participant engaged in IER during the on-line phase
would be positively related to the extent to which he or she engaged in IER during the laboratory
phase. To test Hypothesis 6, I examined (a) the correlation between the on-line bogus item
measure and the laboratory bogus item measure and (b) the correlation between the on-line
narrative IER score and the laboratory narrative IER score.
Hypothesis 6 was supported (see Table 3). In both instances, the given IER index
assessed during the on-line phase showed a significant (p < .01) positive relationship with the
same IER index assessed during the laboratory phase. Specifically, the correlation for the bogus
item IER measure was .55 and the correlation for the narrative IER score was .43.
Stability of IER across Tasks (Hypothesis 7)
Also, I predicted that IER would be relatively stable across tasks (Hypothesis 7). That is,
I expected that the extent to which a participant displayed IER on the bogus items would be
positively related to the extent to which he or she displayed IER on the narrative task. To test
Hypothesis 7, I examined four correlations: (a) the correlation between the on-line bogus item
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measure and the on-line narrative IER score, (b) the correlation between the laboratory bogus
item measure and the laboratory narrative IER score, (c) the correlation between the on-line
bogus item measure and the laboratory narrative IER score, and (d) the correlation between the
laboratory bogus item measure and the on-line narrative IER score. Hypothesis 7 was not
supported. Each of the above correlations was below .10, and none were statistically significant.
Supplementary Analyses
Researchers have suggested that both social contact and environmental distractions may
be causes of IER (Meade & Craig, 2012). Specifically, participants may be less likely to engage
in IER when there is an increased level of social contact and when there are few environmental
distractions. In the current study, the two phases potentially reflected these environmental
differences. The laboratory phase had both a higher level of social contact and less potential for
environmental distractions than did the on-line phase. Thus, I expected that participants would
have engaged in less IER in the laboratory phase than in the on-line phase.
To provide further insight into social contact and environmental distractions as potential
predictors of IER, I conducted the following analyses. First, I conducted a repeated measure t
test to compare the absolute differences of the on-line bogus item measure versus the laboratory
bogus item measure. There was a significant difference in the scores for the on-line bogus item
measure (M = .38, SD = .86) vs. the laboratory bogus item measure (M = .29, SD = .68, t(284) =
-1.98, p = .049). Cohen’s effect size value (d = 0.12) suggested modest practical significance of
these findings.
Similarly, I conducted a repeated measure t test to compare the absolute differences of
the on-line narrative IER score versus the laboratory narrative IER score. There was a
significant difference in the scores for the on-line narrative IER score (M = -43.82, SD = 37.92)
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vs. the laboratory narrative IER score (M = -51.10, SD = 22.80, t(284) = 3.52, p = .001).
Cohen’s effect size value (d = -0.23) suggested modest practical significance of these findings.
IV. DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to examine whether respondent personality is related to
IER and to examine whether IER is stable across time and across situations. I found little
evidence that FFM traits were related to IER. Agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion,
and neuroticism were each unrelated to IER, and openness was related to only some measures of
IER. Because Bowling et al. (2015) found that other-reports of FFM personality traits from a
single acquaintance were related to respondent IER (they observed correlations in the -.20s), I
expected that other-report measures computed from the mean score of multiple acquaintances
would be even more strongly related to IER. However, my results showed little evidence that
other-reported personality traits were related to IER. There is at least one reasonable explanation
for why the current findings differed from those of Bowling et al. Specifically, very few
respondents in the current study engaged in IER. For example, 75.1% of participants correctly
responded to every bogus item within the on-line phase, and 78.6% of participants correctly
responded to every bogus item with the laboratory phase. As a result of such range restriction in
IER, the observed personality-IER relationships may have been attenuated.
Furthermore, I found no evidence of the stability of IER across tasks. That is, the extent
to which participants displayed IER on the bogus item measures was unrelated to the extent to
which they displayed IER on the narrative tasks. However, I did find that IER was relatively
stable across time (and situational context, i.e., on-line versus laboratory). Specifically, the
bogus item IER measure in the on-line phase was positively related to the bogus item IER
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measure in the laboratory phase. Similarly, the narrative IER score in the on-line phase was
positively related to the narrative IER score in the laboratory phase.
Also, I observed several noteworthy supplementary findings. First, participants generally
engaged in less IER within the laboratory (Time 2) than within the on-line setting (Time 1).
These findings are consistent with situational strength theory (Meyer, Dalal, & Hermida, 2010;
Meyer, Dalal, & Bonaccio, 2009; Mischel, 1973, 1979). That is, the laboratory phase may have
presented a stronger situation than did the on-line phase. In other words, there may have been
more powerful cues regarding how one was expected to behave when he or she was in the
laboratory compared with the on-line setting. Because no researcher was present during the online phase and the participant could complete the on-line phase wherever he or she desired, the
situation was weaker, leading the participant to be freer to engage in IER. However, because a
researcher was present during the laboratory phase, there was social exchange between the
researcher and the participant, which may have created a stronger situation. This stronger
situation, in turn, may have discouraged participants from engaging in IER. Furthermore,
differences in levels of environmental distractions may have led to participants engaging in less
IER within the laboratory than within the on-line setting. Participants may have been distracted
(e.g., talking to friends, watching television, texting) when completing the on-line phase. Thus,
they may have engaged in relatively high levels of IER during the on-line phase (see Meade &
Craig, 2012). Alternatively, the laboratory was relatively free from such environmental
distractions. This may have led to relatively lower levels of IER within the laboratory phase.
Although these findings suggested that participants displayed more effort during the
laboratory phase than during the on-line phase, the design of my study allowed for a low-rigor
test of Meade and Craig’s prediction that IER is highest when social contact with the researcher
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is low and when environmental distractions are high. Because these two predictors were likely
confounded (i.e., the on-line phase had low social contact and potentially high distractions; the
laboratory phase had high social contact and low distractions), it is impossible to disentangle
whether IER was lower in the lab setting because of either greater social contact, fewer
distractions, or some other factor.
Observed Incidence of IER
Most participants—66.3%—responded correctly to every bogus item. The range
restriction that was present in each of the four IER measures may have explained the weak
correlations I found between personality traits and IER, as well as the weak correlations I found
between IER measures taken across different tasks. Unfortunately, there is not enough research
on IER thus far to correct for range restriction. It might have been that the short length of the
questionnaire (i.e., the on-line and laboratory questionnaires each included only 57 items)
contributed to this range restriction. Thus, the observed correlations might have been stronger if
I had used longer questionnaires. Moreover, the short length of the self-report questionnaire
might have been the cause of the low rates of IER during both phases of the study as the selfreport questionnaire may not have been long enough to induce IER. In other words, to
“encourage” appreciable levels of IER researchers should perhaps use longer questionnaires than
the ones used in the current study (see Meade & Craig, 2012).
Theoretical and Practical Implications
Researchers have primarily focused on IER from a methodological perspective in that
they have examined how to detect IER and how to minimize its effects (e.g., Huang, Liu, &
Bowling, 2015; Huang et al., 2012; Maniaci & Rogge, 2014; Meade & Craig, 2012). However,
less research has been done to examine IER as a substantive variable, as I did in the current
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study. Investigating IER as a substantive construct rather than a methodological artifact and at
the within-subjects level is necessary in order for researchers to acquire a greater understanding
of IER.
Researchers depend on quality data to provide the most accurate representation of
phenomena of interest. IER is undesirable to researchers because IER can in some cases
attenuate and in other cases artificially inflate predictor-criterion relationships (see Huang, Liu,
& Bowling, 2015). Therefore, if participants engage in high levels of IER when completing a
self-report questionnaire, then one’s data may not provide the best representation of the true
relationship between the predictor and criterion variables. Because IER has undesirable effects
on data, any research that can help to make both researchers and practitioners more
knowledgeable about the causes of IER is valuable because this awareness could help to reduce
IER. The results of the current study provided insight into some of the potential causes of IER.
Specifically, because I found that FFM traits were unrelated to IER, that IER was not stable
across different tasks, but that IER was stable across time (and the confounded setting factor),
the extent to which a person engaged in IER seemed to depend on a particular task. It might
have been that a person was less likely to engage in IER if the task demanded a great amount of
effort compared to a task that did not require much effort to do. Thus, in the current study, it
might have been that the differences that the two IER indices (i.e., bogus item measure in the
questionnaire, words written for open-ended narratives) required of the participant contributed to
the finding that IER was task dependent. It is likely that writing about a hypothetical situation
(i.e., open-ended narratives) demanded greater effort on a participant than did responding to a
Likert-type item (i.e., bogus item measure in questionnaires). So, the amount of effort that was
needed to complete the open-ended narrative tasks would have been greater than what the bogus
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item measure in the questionnaires required. If a participant has expended a larger amount of
energy to complete a task, then it is possible he or she might have been more likely to engage in
IER. Thus, differences in required effort on the study tasks might explain part of the reason why
IER was task dependent.
Future Research
Because range restriction of IER occurred, which may have resulted from my use of a
short questionnaire, future researchers should examine the current study’s hypotheses using a
longer questionnaire. This would create increased opportunities for a participant to engage in
IER, given that questionnaire length is a likely cause of IER (see Meade & Craig, 2012).
Furthermore, researchers should examine non-FFM personality traits as predictors of IER. It
might be that narrow personality traits, such as the sub-facets of the FFM (McCrae, Costa, &
Martin, 2005), may be better predictors of IER than broad FFM personality traits. For instance,
the sub-facet of intellect (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 1990), which is the tendency of a
person to enjoy thinking deeply and solving challenging problems, likely predicts IER better than
does broadly-measured openness. Also, other personality factors that I did not measure may
have influenced participants’ IER behavior. For instance, impulsiveness (McCrae, Costa, &
Martin, 2005) may affect how quickly a participant reads and responds to a survey questionnaire.
If a participant is low in impulse control, then that person may engage in IER because he or she
is easily distracted by competing activities. Also, reading comprehension might be another
predictor of IER (Johnson, 2005). Perhaps a participant who has a lower level of reading
comprehension would engage in more IER because he or she lacks the ability to respond
carefully.
Strengths and Limitations
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There were several limitations of the present study. First, the Cronbach’s alphas for the
bogus item scales were low. Again, this may have resulted from the low base rate of IER
observed within the current dataset. The questionnaires might have been too short to have
induced appreciable levels of IER and therefore may have caused the range restriction in IER.
Another possible explanation for the low reliabilities is that the levels of IER wax and wane for
many participants. Thus, a participant who engages in IER on one part of the questionnaire
might be careful throughout the rest of the questionnaire. Given that the bogus items appeared in
different parts of the questionnaires, it is not surprising that the Cronbach’s alphas are low.
Moreover, Hypothesis 6 (IER will be relatively stable across time) presented a confound
because of the different settings used at Time 1 and Time 2. Setting (i.e., on-line versus
laboratory) was confounded with time. Therefore, any results supporting this hypothesis should
be approached with caution as it is not possible to disentangle whether statistical significance
was found due to the effect of time or due to the effect of setting.
Although researchers have found some evidence for the validity of the open-ended
narrative task as a measure IER (Bowling et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2014), this IER detection
method might have been a limitation in the current study. One disadvantage to using this
detection method was that the lack of control for verbal ability may have presented a possible
confound. Rather than measuring IER, the open-ended narrative task may have measured some
aspects of verbal or writing ability. Moreover, word count might not be the most effective way
to detect the amount of effort a participant has exerted. A participant could have spent a
significant amount of time thinking about the narrative prompt and planning how to best
respond. Further, it could have been that a participant was a concise writer so the participant did
not write many words as a response. The issue would be that that participant would be flagged
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as engaging in IER because the participant provided such a short narrative response. Although
other researchers have used this as a way to detect IER, this method should be regarded with
caution.
Although efforts were taken to counterbalance the tasks within the two phases of the
study, the order of the two phases was not counter-balanced (i.e., the on-line phase was always
administered at T1 and the laboratory phase was always administered at T2). This created the
confound between time and setting. I decided to not counterbalance the on-line and laboratory
phases. I was concerned that if a participant had completed the laboratory phase prior to the online phase, context effects from interaction with the researcher in the first phase might have
filtered into the on-line phase. Moreover, counterbalancing the phases would have complicated
the study design. However, designing the study so that each participant completed the on-line
phase before the laboratory phase created a confound.
Another possible limitation might have been the breach of anonymity at the end of the
on-line phase. After participants completed the self-report questionnaire and the open-ended
narrative task on-line, they were asked to provide information regarding several people who
knew the participants well. The participants had to provide their names so that the raters would
know for whom they were responding to the short IPIP. However, prior research has provided
conflicting results regarding whether anonymity encourages or discourages IER (Douglas &
McGarty, 2001; Lee, 2006; Meade & Craig (2012).
Another possible limitation might have been the use of the same self-report questionnaire
during both phases of the study. Because the same questionnaire was administered in the two
phases, participants were exposed to the same set of personality items and bogus items. This
design could have influenced how participants attended to the bogus items. This is known as the
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recency effect, a situation in which a cognitive bias increases the importance of a recently
encountered stimulus (Bjork & Whitten, 1974; Craik & Lockhart, 1972). For instance, if a
certain bogus item was especially salient to a participant during the on-line phase, there may
have been a chance that the item remained salient to the participant while he or she completed
the questionnaire in the laboratory phase. Thus, the participant’s salient memory of the item
could have inflated the chances that the participant was more aware of the item when
encountering it in the laboratory phase, especially if the time elapsed between the two phases
was short. This recency effect could have led to the participant being more attentive when
completing the questionnaire than the participant would have otherwise been, thus decreasing the
chances for the participant to engage in IER.
Despite these limitations, the present study had several strengths. First, I used multiple
methods to measure IER (i.e., bogus items, open-ended narrative) rather than only one. The IER
detection methods that I used have been found to be some of the more effective IER indices (see
Huang et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2012; Huang, Liu, & Bowling, 2015). Specifically, Meade and
Craig (2012) found that the bogus items were one of the most effective measures of IER
compared to other methods. Furthermore, participants had the opportunity to provide otherreports of personality for as many as five different raters rather than for only one acquaintance.
The inclusion of rating from multiple raters should have increased the reliability and validity of
my personality data (Funder & Colvin, 1988).
Conclusion
The purpose of the current study was to examine personality as a predictor of IER and to
determine whether IER can be considered a trait, similar to personality, by assessing the stability
of IER across time and across tasks. I found limited evidence for relationships between FFM
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personality traits and IER. Furthermore, I found no evidence that IER was stable across tasks.
However, I did find that IER was stable across time (and the confounded setting factor), which
provides partial support that IER is trait-like. This finding suggests that IER could be regarded
more as a trait that is enduring rather than a state that is fleeting. Clearly, this new
conceptualization of IER would have significant implications on how IER is studied in the
future. For example, researchers might focus more on the substantive nature of IER, examining
personality correlates and potential causes, rather than focus on the methodological nature of
IER. Also, if IER is regarded more as a trait rather than a state, researchers might re-evaluate
best practices for measuring IER. Given the theoretical and practical importance of IER, I
encourage future research on the substantive nature of IER.
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Table 1.
Comparison between Study Tasks
Study Task

Amount of Researcher
Supervision

Response Format

Self-report questionnaire
completed outside the lab

Low

Closed-ended

Narrative completed
outside the lab

Low

Open-ended

Self-report questionnaire
completed within the lab

High

Closed-ended

Narrative completed
within the lab

High

Open-ended
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Table 2.
Tasks to be Administered During the Two Phases
On-line phase
Self-report questionnaire

Laboratory phase

The participant completed an
on-line questionnaire.

Open-ended narrative

The participant completed the
open-ended narrative on-line.

Self-report questionnaire

The participant completed a
pencil-and-paper
questionnaire.

Open-ended narrative

The participant wrote an
open-ended narrative.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study Variables
Variable
M
SD
1

2

3

4

5

6

1. On-line bogus item measure

.38

.86

_

2. Laboratory bogus item measure

.29

.68

.55**

3. On-line narrative IER score

-43.82

37.92

.07

.09

_

4. Laboratory narrative IER score

-51.10

22.80

.05

.05

.43**

5. Other-reported agreeableness

5.38

.92

-.08

-.12

-.08

-.10

_

6. Other-reported
conscientiousness

4.79

1.09

-.07

-.04

-.12

-.13

.24**

_

7. Other-reported openness

5.18

.80

-.05

-.03

-.14*

-.06

.37**

.20**

8. Other-reported extraversion

4.69

1.17

.02

-.09

-.04

.04

.29**

.02

9. Other-reported neuroticism

3.67

.98

.04

.06

.10

.05

-.18**

Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01.

7

8

_

_

-.24**

_
.12

_

-.24**

-.01
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Table 4.
Correlations for Study Variables and Self-Reported Personality
Variable
1
2
3
4
5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1. On-line bogus
2. Laboratory bogus
.61**
3. On-line narrative
.12
.11
4. Laboratory narrative
.13
.12 .43**
5. OR agreeableness
-.11
-.14 -.10
-.10
6. OR conscientiousness
-.10
.03 -.11
-.11 .22**
7. OR openness
-.12
.01 -.12* -.12 .43** .21**
8. OR extraversion
.03
-.11 .02
.00 .35** .23
.33
9. OR neuroticism
.01
.12 .13
.12 -.27* -.26* -.21* .02
10. SO agreeableness
-.12
-.22 -.11
-.22 .64* .42** -.23 .44** -.31*
11. SO conscientiousness
-.10
.13 -.22
-.21 .41* .31** .23* .33
-.21
.10*
12. SO openness
.02
.10 -.21
-.12 .40
.30
.54* .42*
-.32* .30* .23*
13. SO extraversion
.14
.02 -.13
-.11 .42** .31
.43 .65** -.31
.32
.47*
.33
14. SO neuroticism
.20
.21 .20
.13 -.35
-.44* -.20 .23
.51* -.42* -.35** .30
15. SL agreeableness
-.21
-.3 -.21
-.21 .71** .64* -.32 .52*
-.22* .74* .55** .43
16. SL conscientiousness
-.31
.20 -.24
-.31 .42* .75** .31* .34
-.40* .52* .68** .41
17. SL openness
.61
-.23
.12 -.13
.10 .51*
.32*
.70* .63** -.42* .41
.50
18. SL extraversion
-.11
.14 -.20
.11 .60** .40*
.71* .76** -.52* .62* .41
.50
19. SL neuroticism
-.31
.32 .21
-.33 .52** .31*
.23* .34
.61* .16* -.38** .52
Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01. OR = other-reported. SO = self-reported online. SL = self-reported in laboratory.

13

14

15

16

.32
.51 -.43
.30 -.31 .44
.52 -.30 .51 .33
.60 .32 .62 .51
.51 .17 -.41 -.50

17

18

.71 .22 -.32
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APPENDIX A

Slightly Disagree

Neither Agree Nor Disagree

Slightly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

1. I am the life of the party.
2. I feel little concern for others.
3. I am always prepared.
4. I get stressed out easily.
5. I have a rich vocabulary.
6. I don't talk a lot.
7. I am interested in people.
8. I have been to every country in the world.
9. I leave my belongings around.
10. I am relaxed most of the time.
11. I have difficulty understanding abstract ideas.
12. I feel comfortable around people.
13. I insult people.
14. I pay attention to details.
15. I worry about things.
16. I have a vivid imagination.
17. I have never used a computer.
18. I keep in the background.
19. I sympathize with others' feelings.
20. I make a mess of things.
21. I seldom feel blue.
22. I am not interested in abstract ideas.
23. I start conversations.
24. I am not interested in other people's problems.
25. I sleep less than one hour per night.
26. I get chores done right away.

Disagree

Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to
be in the future. Describe yourself as you honestly see yourself,
in relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are,
and roughly your same age. So that you can describe yourself in
an honest manner, your responses will be kept in absolute
confidence. Please answer each question by selecting the
response option that most closely matches your opinion.

Strongly Disagree

Self-Report Questionnaire Used in Both On-Line and In-Lab Questionnaires.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

Slightly Disagree

Neither Agree Nor Disagree

Slightly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

27. I am easily disturbed.
28. I have excellent ideas.
29. I have little to say.
30. I have a soft heart.
31. I often forget to put things back in their proper place.
32. I get upset easily.
33. I can teleport across time and space.
34. I do not have a good imagination.
35. I talk to a lot of different people at parties.
36. I am not really interested in others.
37. I like order.
38. I change my mood a lot.
39. I am quick to understand things.
40. I don't like to draw attention to myself.
41. I am enrolled in a Psychology course currently.
42. I take time out for others.
43. I shirk my duties.
44. I have frequent mood swings.
45. I use difficult words.
46. I don't mind being the center of attention.
47. I feel others’ emotions.
48. I can run two miles in two minutes.
49. I follow a schedule.
50. I get irritated easily.
51. I spend time reflecting on things.
52. I am quiet around strangers.
53. I make people feel at ease.
54. I am exacting in my work.
55. I am using a computer currently.
56. I often feel blue.
57. I am full of ideas.

Disagree

Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to
be in the future. Describe yourself as you honestly see yourself,
in relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are,
and roughly your same age. So that you can describe yourself in
an honest manner, your responses will be kept in absolute
confidence. Please answer each question by selecting the
response option that most closely matches your opinion.

Strongly Disagree
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Demographic Questions (These items were included in the on-line questionnaire)
1. What is your gender? (Please select one)

Female

Male

2. What is your age in years?

The following questions will be used to track your participation throughout this study. Though
your answers will likely be unique to you, please remember what you put for each question. If a
question does not apply to you, please make up something that you will remember for the next
testing session.
Please do not make up your name though. Your name will be sent to the person who will be
filling out a questionnaire on your behalf and it will be how they know why they are getting the
survey.
What are the last four (4) digits of your cell phone number?
What was your high school mascot?
What was your first job?
What was the name of your first pet?
What is your full name?
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APPENDIX B
Descriptions of the Self-Report Questionnaire Items.
Item Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14

Item Content
“I am the life of the
party.”
“I feel little concern for
others.” (R)
“I am always prepared.”
“I get stressed out
easily.” (R)
“I have a rich
vocabulary.”
“I don't talk a lot.” (R)
“I am interested in
people.”
“I have been to every
country in the world.”
“I leave my belongings
around.” (R)
“I am relaxed most of the
time.”
“I have difficulty
understanding abstract
ideas.” (R)
“I feel comfortable
around people.”
“I insult people.” (R)
“I pay attention to
details.”

Openness

Conscientiousness

Extraversion

Agreeableness

Emotional
Stability

Bogus

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Xa
X
X
X

X
X
X
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Item Number
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Item Content
“I worry about things.”
(R)
“I have a vivid
imagination.”
“I have never used a
computer.”
“I keep in the
background.” (R)
“I sympathize with
others' feelings.”
“I make a mess of
things.” (R)
“I seldom feel blue.”
“I am not interested in
abstract ideas.” (R)
“I start conversations.”
“I am not interested in
other people's problems.”
(R)
“I sleep less than one
hour per night.”
“I get chores done right
away.”
“I am easily disturbed.”
(R)
“I have excellent ideas.”
“I have little to say.” (R)
“I have a soft heart.”
“I often forget to put
things back in their
proper place.” (R)

Openness

Conscientiousness

Extraversion

Agreeableness

Emotional
Stability
X

Bogus

X
Xb
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Xa
X
X
X
X
X
X
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Item Number
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Item Content
“I get upset easily.” (R)
“I can teleport across
time and space.”
“I do not have a good
imagination.” (R)
“I talk to a lot of different
people at parties.”
“I am not really
interested in others.” (R)
“I like order.”
“I change my mood a
lot.” (R)
“I am quick to
understand things.”
“I don't like to draw
attention to myself.” (R)
“I am enrolled in a
Psychology course
currently.”
“I take time out for
others.”
“I shirk my duties.” (R)
“I have frequent mood
swings.” (R)
“I use difficult words.”
“I don't mind being the
center of attention.”
“I feel others’ emotions.”
“I can run two miles in
two minutes.”
“I follow a schedule.”

Openness

Conscientiousness

Extraversion

Agreeableness

Emotional
Stability
X

Bogus
Xb

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Xa

X
X
X
X
X
X
Xb
X
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Item Number
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Item Content
“I get irritated easily.”
(R)
“I spend time reflecting
on things.”
“I am quiet around
strangers.” (R)
“I make people feel at
ease.”
“I am exacting in my
work.”
“I am using a computer
currently.”
“I often feel blue.” (R)
“I am full of ideas.”

Openness

Conscientiousness

Extraversion

Agreeableness

Emotional
Stability
X

Bogus

X
X
X
X
Xa
X
X

Note. Each of the FFM items were from the IPIP (Goldberg et al., 2006). “R” denotes reverse scored item. For the bogus items,
a

denotes Meade and Craig (2012); b denotes Huang et al. (In Press).
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APPENDIX C
Bogus Items.
1. I have been to every country in the world (careful responses = “disagree” or “strongly
disagree”).
2. I have never used a computer (careful responses = “disagree” or “strongly disagree”).
3. I sleep less than one hour per night (careful responses = “disagree” or “strongly
disagree”).
4. I can teleport across time and space (careful responses = “disagree” or “strongly
disagree”).
5. I am enrolled in a Psychology course currently (careful responses = “agree” or “strongly
agree”).
6. I can run two miles in two minutes (careful responses = “disagree” or “strongly
disagree”).
7. I am using a computer currently (careful responses for the on-line phase = “agree” or
“strongly agree”; careful responses for the laboratory phase = “disagree” or “strongly
disagree”).
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APPENDIX D
Open-ended Narrative.

Using the space below, please describe your ideal vacation.

Using the space below, please describe your dream job.
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APPENDIX E

The following questions ask about different aspects of your
PARTNER/FRIEND’S personality. Please mark the
response that best reflects the extent to which each
statement describes HIM/HER.

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Slightly Disagree

Neither Agree nor
Disagree

Slightly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

Other-Report of Personality Questionnaire.

1. He/she is the life of the party.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2. He/she sympathizes with others’ feelings.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. He/she gets chores done right away.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. He/she has frequent mood swings.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5. He/she has a vivid imagination.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6. He/she doesn’t talk a lot. (R)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7. He/she is not interested in other people’s problems. (R)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8. He/she often forgets to put things back in their proper
place. (R)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9. He/she is relaxed most of the time. (R)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10. For this question, please choose ‘slightly agree.’ a

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

11. He/she is not interested in abstract ideas. (R)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

12. He/she talks to a lot of different people at parties.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

13. He/she feels others’ emotions.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

14. He/she likes order.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

15. He/she gets upset easily.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

16. He/she has difficulty understanding abstract ideas. (R)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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17. He/she keeps in the background. (R)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

18. He/she is not really interested in others. (R)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

19. He/she makes a mess of things. (R)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

20. For this question, please chose ‘disagree.’ a

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

21. He/she seldom feels blue. (R)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

22. He/she does not have a good imagination. (R)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Note. Each of the FFM items were from the mini-IPIP (Donnellan et al., 2006). “R” denotes a
reverse scored item. adenotes an instructed response item (Meade & Craig, 2012).

59
APPENDIX F
Descriptions of the Other-Report Questionnaire Items.
Item Number
Openness Conscientiousness
Item Content
1

“He/she is the life of
the party.”

2

“He/she sympathizes
with others’ feelings.”

3

“He/she gets chores
done right away.”

4

“He/she has frequent
mood swings.”

5

“He/she has a vivid
imagination.”

6

“He/she doesn’t talk a
lot.” (R)

7

“He/she is not
interested in other
people’s problems.”
(R)

8

“He/she often forgets
to put things back in
their proper place.”

Extraversion

Agreeableness

Neuroticism

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Directed
Response

60
Item Number

Item Content

9

“He/she is relaxed
most of the time.” (R)

10

11

12

13

14

Openness

Conscientiousness

Extraversion

Agreeableness

Neuroticism

X

“For this question,
please choose ‘slightly
agree.’”
“He/she is not
interested in abstract
ideas.” (R)

X

X

“He/she talks to a lot
of different people at
parties.”

X

“He/she feels others’
emotions.”

X

“He/she likes order.”
X

15

16

“He/she gets upset
easily.”
“He/she has difficulty
understanding abstract
ideas.” (R)

Directed
Response

X
X
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Item Number

Item Content

17

“He/she keeps in the
background” (R)

18

“He/she is not really
interested in others.”
(R)

19

“He/she makes a mess
of things.” (R)

20

“For this question,
please chose
‘disagree.’”

21

“He/she seldom feels
blue.” (R)

22

“He/she does not have
a good imagination.”
(R)

Openness

Conscientiousness

Extraversion

Agreeableness

Neuroticism

Directed
Response

X
X

X

X

X

X

Note. Each of the FFM items were from the IPIP (Goldberg et al., 2006). “R” denotes reverse scored item.
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